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Self-Determination and Humanitarian
Intervention in a Community of Power
JAMES A.R. NAFZIGER*
The night can sweat with terror as before
We pieced our thoughts into philosophy,
And planned to bring the world under a rule,
Who are but weasels fighting in a hole.
-W. B. Yeats'
In the gradual transition from a balance of power system of interna-
tional relations to a community of power,' forces of both integration and
fragmentation have gained momentum. s Economic integration of the Eu-
ropean Community, for example, has been offset by political disintegra-
tion to the east and a resurgence of policy differences throughout the con-
tinent. In the Middle East, Iraq's acceptance of greater Kurdish
autonomy may be a trade-off for reintegrating Iraq into regional and in-
ternational relationships and restoring its access to foreign trade markets.
China, Taiwan and the two Koreas acknowledged their political divisions
in return for greater integration into global institutions. As these adjust-
ments to a new order demonstrate, short-term fragmentation may en-
hance or detract from long-term integration. The forces are both comple-
* Professor of Law, Willamette University College of Law; B.A., M.A. University of
Wisconsin; J.D. Harvard University.
1. Nineteen Hundred and Nineteen, in SELECTED POEMS AND Two PLAYS OF WILLIAM
BUTLER YEATS 109 (Macha Louis Rosenthal ed., 1962). This passage, which concludes the
stanza that begins, "Now days are dragon-ridden, the nightmare [rlides upon sleep," reflects
on the Irish "Troubles" following the 1916 Easter Rebellion during World War I. In The
Second Coming, Yeats opens on a similar note of despair about the centrifugal tendencies of
the world around him:
Turning and turning in the widening gyre
The falcon cannot hear the falconer;
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world.
Id. at 91. The anxious, contemporary ring of these lines may soften if one considers the
Wilsonian legacy from the same period of international institutions to help restore and
maintain order.
2. "There must be, not a balance of power, but a community of power; not organized
rivalries, but an organized common peace." Address by Woodrow Wilson to the United
States Senate (January 22, 1917), reprinted in 40 THE PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON: Nov.
20, 1916 - JAN. 23, 1917, 536 (Arthur Link ed., 1982).
3. See John L. Gaddis, Toward the Post-Cold War World, 70 FOREIGN AFF. 102 (1991)
(discussion of the forces of integration in global communications, economics, security, ideas,
and peacemaking; and fragmentation, especially of states such as the Soviet Union and Yu-
goslavia under internal pressures for self-determination by constituent republics and
regions).
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mentary and antithetical in the fluctuating circumstances of the post-
Cold War era.
For lawyers, this process of change raises a welter of issues, of which
claimed rights of self-determination and humanitarian intervention are
prominent.4 When should international law bless self-determination that
fragments previously unified "nations," or authorize the use of force for
humanitarian reasons? Is self-determination alone a valid justification for
humanitarian intervention? What means of giving effect to either of these
claimed rights are appropriate and feasible? When is unilateral interven-
tion for humanitarian reasons acceptable in the absence of an effective
system of peaceful dispute resolution and collective security under the
United Nations Charter? What should be the role of the United Nations
in implementing self-determination and humanitarian intervention dur-
ing a transition to a community of power? When do concerns about
human rights - whose immediate promotion and protection have gener-
ally been left to domestic authority - become issues of international
peace and security? How can the UN reconcile its intervention on behalf
of human rights with rules and principles of non-interference in the do-
mestic affairs of states? How can multilateral mechanisms be improved to
respond more efficiently and effectively to issues of self-determination
and humanitarian intervention?
Answers to such questions have been exceptionally difficult for three
reasons: (1) the vagueness of international standards for self-determina-
tion and humanitarian intervention, unilateral or collective; (2) the reli-
ance of enforcement measures on an accurate description of often contro-
versial facts and unilateral interpretations of critical events and norms;
and (3) the fragility of multilateral means to avoid and resolve disputes.
Although the concepts of self-determination and humanitarian interven-
tion are well-established in diplomatic communication and enshrined in
international legal debates, their content remains disappointingly vague.
They do provide a basic vocabulary for claim and counterclaim and for
resolving disputes. In spite of this, they have never assisted effectively in
resolving concrete problems, except in the most obvious contexts. For ex-
ample, although the issue of self-determination has figured prominently
in debates about the Falkland/Malvinas Islands, the United Nations has
come to no definitive conclusion about its applicability, because of confuz
sion about the meaning and scope of the right.5
In the post-Cold War system, however, multilateralism offers a prom-
ising and practical alternative to jurisprudential hairsplitting and a jum-
bled practice of states to guide decisions about claims of self-determina-
4. Among the troublesome legal issues of the post-Cold War era, self-determination and
humanitarian intervention are singled out for attention in this article because of their grow-
ing prominence and interrelationship. International and regional institutions may also im-
prove the implementation of both.
5. See MICHAEL AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 296-97
(5th ed. 1984).
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tion and humanitarian intervention. The community of power, though
still incipient, is becoming a reality. The end of East-West bipolarity and
a confidence in the United Nations and regional frameworks has
presented new opportunities for improved standard-setting, fact-finding
and mediated responses to self-determination and humanitarian interven-
tion claims. Of course, favoring multilateral responses to national crises of
international significance is nothing new. What is new is the heightened
capacity of multilateral institutions to do so.
This study will first revisit the battle-strewn terrain of self-determi-
nation and humanitarian intervention in order to highlight the aridity of
those rights.6 As the study later suggests, however, the post-Cold War era
may be a good time for the global community to move on to the more
fertile ground of multilateralism. It seems time, in other words, to shift
attention and resources from endless debates about terminology and his-
torical justification to more practical discussions about reconciling con-
flicting interests in an emerging community of power. The past is signifi-
cant prologue to a consideration of alternatives for constructing a better
world order.7
6. The literature on these topics is vast. For bibliographical references, see BURNS WES-
TON ET. AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 737 (2d ed. 1990) (self-determination
and minority rights); id. at 964 (humanitarian intervention); FERNANDO TES6N, HUMANITA-
RIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND MORALITY (1988) (humanitarian
intervention).
7. Struggles of external and internal self-determination, like instances of intervention,
are kaleidoscopic. For example, in just one month (March 1990, which the author randomly
selected), the following events occurred: the first nonpartisan elections were held in the So-
viet Union; Boris Yeltsin won a seat in the Russian Supreme Soviet; the Third Soviet Con-
gress of People's Deputies repealed a constitutional guarantee of Communist Party monop-
oly; Mikhail Gorbachev was elected to a newly defined presidency with broader powers; the
Supreme Soviet of Georgia denounced its incorporation 49 years earlier into the Soviet
Union, apparently unwilling to wait for a 50th birthday cake; Estonia declared its right to
secede from the Soviet Union; and Lithuania declared its independence, formed a coalition
government, and was confronted by Soviet convoys and paratroopers.
Also in March 1990, Soviet troops began to withdraw from Hungary; free elections were
held in East Germany; and Serbia assumed direct control of police in rebellious Kosovo, the
ethnically Albanian, supposedly autonomous region. In South Africa, Nelson Mandela, re-
cently released from prison, assumed leadership of the African National Congress; called for
a continuation of United Nations sanctions against his country, and prepared for first-ever
talks with President de Klerk, just as South African troops intervened in the "homeland" of
Ciskei. Elsewhere in Africa, Namibia gained independence with help from the United Na-
tions, after 75 years of South African control, and promptly became a U.N. member; France
airlifted troops to reestablish order in Gabon, which had been torn by pro-democracy strikes
and protests; and in Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe, running against the historical tide, termed
his party's landslide election a "mandate to create a one-party state." In Latin America,
among other events: Grenada experienced a peaceful transition of governments after parlia-
mentary elections; and Nicaragua ended its long civil war after United Nations-assisted
elections, beginning a remarkable government transition under UN supervision. In Asia, In-
dia withdrew the last of its peace-keeping troops from Sri Lanka, and sent in its security
police against Muslim insurgents in Kashmir. Coercive measures against political dissidents
in China increased. See generally Peter Hayes, Chronology 1990, 70:1 FOREIGN AFF. 206
(1991).
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I. SELF-DETERMINATION
In today's world, a global identity crisis pits popular aspirations
against national and international cohesion, ensuring that struggles for
self-determination will play a major role in global affairs. In addition,
global communication has introduced a new kind of domino effect, in
which the achievement of liberty in one country seems to cause repressive
regimes to topple, or at least to wobble, in others.' National issues of self-
determination quickly become issues of international peace and security.
Claims for internal self-determination - the right of peoples to deter-
mine their domestic political, economic and social systems democratically
- have become as resonant as claims for external self-determination -
the right of peoples to determine their institutions and way of life free of
outside control or interference.
The origin of self-determination, as a right of peoples rather than
individuals, lies in critiques of sovereignty by Grotius and Pufendorf and
in the libertarian movements of the eighteenth century." With its claim of
inalienable rights, the United States' Declaration of Independence pro-
vided the cornerstone for a modern regime of popular aspirations. In the
twentieth century, Woodrow Wilson and V.I. Lenin both championed the
principle of self-determination.10 The peace treaties following World War
I established a nation-system in Europe and regimes of rights for minor-
ity populations based on what was then regarded as a fledgling principle
of self-determination. The Covenant of the League of Nations established
a measure of self-determination for mandated territories, but did not ar-
ticulate a general principle."' The Atlantic Charter12 influenced delegates
to the San Francisco Conference in 1945 to incorporate a general princi-
ple of self-determination into Article 1(2) of the United Nations Charter.
Accordingly, a central purpose of the organization is to, "develop friendly
relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights
and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate mea-
What may be most striking about the events of March 1990, or any month in this ex-
traordinary period of time, is the following: first, the variety of ways in which self-determi-
nation was expressed; second, the frequency of state intervention, sometimes assisting popu-
lar aspirations from inside and outside but too often suppressing them; and, third, the
increasing role of United Nations intervention of various kinds on behalf of self-determina-
tion and democracy.
8. "A new kind of domino theory has emerged, in which the achievement of liberty in
one country causes repressive regimes to topple, or at least wobble in others." Gaddis, supra
note 3, at 103.
9. SARAH WAMBAUGH, A MONOGRAPH ON PLEBEscITEs wrrH A COLLECTION OF SPECIAL
DocuMENTs 1, 4 (1920) (an excellent treatise on self-determination in the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries).
10. See ROBERT SCHAEFFER, WARPATHS: THE POLTICS OF PARTITION (1990).
11. For a summary of pertinent pre-World War II history, see Daniel Thirer, Self-
Determination, in 8 ENCYC. PuB. INT'L L. 470 (Rudolph Bernhardt ed., 1981).
12. See Edward Laing, The Contribution of the Atlantic Charter to Human Rights
Law and Humanitarian Universalism, 26 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 113 (1989).
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sures to strengthen universal peace." 3 Provisions in Articles 55,14 7315
and 76(1)6 were intended to confirm the principle. Article 21(3) of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which provides a customary
elaboration of Article 55, states that, "The will of the people shall be the
basis of the authority of government.' 7 This provision merits special at-
tention. Although the Universal Declaration does not refer to self-deter-
mination by that term, Article 21(3) stands out in this first International
Bill of Rights because of its attribution of a democratic right to a "peo-
ple" rather than to individuals. The coincidence of the political will of the.
people with a full expression of self-determination is apparent. Some
13. U.N. CHARTER art. 1(2)(emphasis added).
14. Article 55.
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which
are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on re-
spect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of people, the
United Nations shall promote:
a. higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of eco-
nomic and social progress and development;
b. solutions of international economic, social, health, and related
problems; and international cultural and educational co-operation; and
c. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamen-
tal freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or
religion.
Id. art. 55 (emphasis added).
15. Article 73.
Members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities for
the administration of territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full
measure of self-government recognize the principle that the interests of the
inhabitants of these territories are paramount, and accept as a sacred trust the
obligation to promote to the utmost, within the system of international peace
and security established by the present Charter, the well-being of the inhabi-
tants of these territories, and, to this end:
b. to develop self-government, to take due account of the political aspi-
rations of the peoples, and to assist them in the progressive develop-
ment of their free political institutions, according to the particular cir-
cumstances of each territory and its peoples and their varying stages of
advancement ....
Id. art. 73.
16. Article 76.
The basic objectives of the trusteeship system, in accordance with the Pur-
poses of the United Nations laid down in Article 1 of the present Charter, shall
be:
b. to promote the political, economic, social, and educational advance-
ment of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progressive
development towards self-government or independence as may be ap-
propriate to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peo-
ples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned, and as
may be provided by the terms of each trusteeship agreement ....
Id. art. 76. (emphasis added).
17. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 21(3), G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/810,
at 75 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration].
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have argued, therefore, that the Universal Declaration can be interpreted
to endorse a political right of internal self-determination. Thus, what
originated in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as an external
right of people to be free of foreign domination, was arguably broadened
under the Universal Declaration (and by reference, the Charter) into an
internal right of democratic franchise."8 This argument is controversial,
however, both because it is based on a provision of the Universal Declara-
tion that makes no explicit reference to self-determination and because
the existence of a right of internal self-determination is itself
controversial.
The right of self-determination has been most clearly recognized in
the context of post-World War II decolonization. Indeed, the Declaration
on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,
which was unanimously adopted by the United Nations General Assem-
bly, provided the first detailed articulation of the right.1 The Interna-
tional Court of Justice helped develop the right of self-determination in
two cases arising out of colonialism. In the Namibia case,20 the Court af-
firmed the applicability of self-determination in non-self-governing terri-
tories. In the Western Sahara case,2 1 the Court simply proclaimed the
right of peoples to determine their political status by their freely ex-
pressed will. Numerous General Assembly and Security Council resolu-
tions have applied a right of self-determination to condemn racist re-
gimes, particularly in Rhodesia and South Africa, and to vindicate the
rights of Palestinians. 22
The most important provision for a general right of self-determina-
18. Jordan Paust, International Legal Standards Concerning the Legitimacy of Gov-
ernmental Power, 5 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1063 (1990).
19. The Declaration states:
2. All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social
and cultural development.
5. Immediate steps shall be taken, in Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territo-
ries or all other territories which have not yet attained independence, to trans-
fer all powers to the peoples of those territories, without any conditions or
reservations, in accordance with their freely expressed will and desire, without
any distinction as to race, creed or colour, in order to enable them to enjoy
complete independence and freedom.
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G. A. Res.
1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960)(emphasis
added).
20. Advisory Opinion on Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of
South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution
276, 1971 I.C.J. 16 (June 21). See generally JOHN DUGARD, THE SOUTH WEST AFRICA/
NAMIBIA DISPUTE (1973).
21. Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 31-35 (Oct. 16, 1975).
22. For a partial listing of these documents, see Lung-Chu Chen, Self-Determination as
a Human Right, in TOWARD WORLD ORDER AND HUMAN DIGNITY 198, 252, nn. 85-86 (W.
Michael Reisman & Burns Weston eds., 1976).
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tion is found in Articles 1(1) and (3) of the International Covenants on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and on Civil and Political Rights,2"
both of which entered into force in 1976. It is significant that the two
Covenants correlate self-determination with political freedom, and that
this is not explicitly limited to freedom from external (foreign)
domination.
Other instruments substantiate this right of self-determination. The
1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations provides that, "By virtue of the
principle of equal rights and self-determination . . .all peoples have the
right to determine, without external interference, their political status...
and every State has the duty to respect this right in accordance with the
provisions of the Charter ... [and] the duty to promote ... self-determi-
nation of peoples .... ,,24 The Final Act (Helsinki Accords) of the Confer-
ence on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), which has played a
significant role in reshaping Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, pro-
vides a recital of the right of self-determination 25 that concisely encapsu-
23. The Covenants state:
1. All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social
and cultural development....
3. The States Parties to the present Covenant... shall promote the realization
of the right of self-determination, and shall respect that right, in conformity
with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 1, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR,
21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights, id. at 49 (emphasis added)[hereinafter Covenants].
24. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G. A.
Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970) [hereinaf-
ter Declaration on Friendly Relations].
25. The Helsinki Accords state:
PRINCIPLE VIII
The participating States will respect the equal rights of peoples and their
right to self-determination, acting at all times in conformity with the purposes
and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and with the relevant
norms of international law, including those relating to territorial integrity of
States.
By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peo-
ples, all peoples always have the right, in full freedom, to determine, when and
as they wish, their internal and external political status, without external inter-
ference, and to pursue as they wish their political, economic, social and cul-
tural development.
The participating States reaffirm the universal significance of respect for
and effective exercise of equal rights and self-determination of peoples for the
development of friendly relations among themselves as among all States; they
also recall the importance of the elimination of any form of violation of this
principle.
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE): Final Act, Aug. 1, 1975, Princi-
ple VIII, reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 1292, 1295 (1975) [hereinafter Helsinki Accords] (emphasis
added).
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lates current thinking.16
Subsequent instruments of the CSCE have incorporated the follow-
ing language: "We reaffirm the equal rights of peoples and their right to
self-determination in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations
and with the relevant norms of international law, including those relating
to territorial integrity of states. 2 7 Unfortunately, the CSCE documents
do not elaborate the right any further, so that their reaffirmation of it
might be interpreted either as boiler-plate language or, more likely, terms
of art elaborated in other instruments.
The context of the CSCE reaffirmation suggests that the right of self-
determination was intended to be quite narrow. In the Charter of Paris
the right appears under the heading, "Friendly Relations among Partici-
pating States,' '2 8 rather than "Human Dimension." 9 The latter heading
refers to the salient commitments of CSCE members in implementing
human rights and fundamental freedoms. Because the "Human Dimen-
sion" section devotes particular attention to the rights of national minori-
ties, it is reasonable to infer that, as in the Helsinki Accords, the internal
rights of national minorities do not fall within the definition of self-deter-
mination in the Charter of Paris.
The Copenhagen Document"0 reinforces this construction. The ab-
26. Note these useful conclusions drawn from Principle VIII:
- One, it clearly applies to peoples within a sovereign state as it is ad-
dressed particularly to the states of Europe.
- Two, it does not apply to "national minorities" as such, since such
groups are covered by Principle VII and in that respect are not accorded self-
determination but only minority rights. It has been suggested that peoples en-
joying a constitutional status in a multinational state (e.g. U.S.S.R. and Yugo-
slavia) are not minorities and hence have the right to self-determination. See
Antonio Cassesse [sic], The Helsinki Declaration and Self-Determination, in
HUMAN RIGHTS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE HELSINKI AcCORDs 83, 95-103
([Thomas] Buergenthal ed. 1977).
- Three, the phrase "in full freedom" was intended to preclude coercion
by a government in respect of the choice by the peoples of their internal re-
gime or policies. This was made explicit by the sponsor, the Netherlands, and
other supporting governments. Id. [at 102-103]
- Four, the principle also recognizes that self-determination must not dis-
rupt the territorial integrity of states and therefore does not apparently sanc-
tion secession, but this is not inconsistent with recognition of internal free
choice.
Louis HENKIN ET. AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 283 (2d ed. 1987).
27. These Post-Cold War instruments include CSCE: Charter of Paris for a New Eu-
rope and Supplementary Document to Give Effect to Certain Provisions of the Charter,
Nov. 21, 1990, reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 190, 197 (1991) [hereinafter Paris Charter]; and Re-
port of the CSCE Meeting of Experts on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, Feb. 8, 1991,
reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 382, 386 (1991) [hereinafter Valletta Report on Peaceful Settlement]
(emphasis added).
28. Paris Charter, supra note 27, at 196.
29. Id. at 199.
30. CSCE: Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human
Dimension, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1305 (1990)[hereinafter Copenhagen Document].
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sence in the Copenhagen Document of a self-determination rubric sug-
gests the limits of self-determination in the post-Cold War vocabulary for
expressing a "human dimension" within the CSCE framework. The Val-
letta Report on Peaceful Settlement also seems to distinguish "self-deter-
mination" from other specific commitments undertaken by CSCE mem-
bers to protect human rights in their territories. After declaring that, "the
advancement of democracy, and respect for and exercise of human rights,
are indispensable," ' the Introduction to the Valletta Report adds that,
"they also reaffirm .. .[the right of] self-determination, ' '1 2 as if to make
the two kinds of rights disjunctive.
These post-Cold War instruments of the CSCE do not clarify the
meaning of "national minorities" except to suggest that they are not pro-
tected by the right of "self-determination." The Copenhagen Document
establishes that, "To belong to a national minority is a matter of a per-
son's individual choice,""3 thereby distancing the term further from an
objective definition. Perhaps it is possible to know a national minority
when one sees one, but impressions can be perilous.
Whether self-determination is a principle or a right once generated
heated controversy. Although that jurisprudential controversy has been
resolved in favor of establishing self-determination as a right, the norma-
tive ambiguity of the right is almost endless. The questions are legion and
always have been.34 For example:
1. Does the right apply only in non-self-governing territories, that is,
primarily in the process of decolonization? In post-independence circum-
stances, does the right extend at least to all people trapped in conquered
or ceded territories? Does it apply against occupying powers apart from
other protections of international law? If so, must the majority of the
people exercising the right actually reside in the territory of an occupying
power?
2. If the right protects people, both in non-self-governing and self-
governing territories against external interference, what may they deter-
mine exactly? Independence from indirect as well as direct foreign inter-
ference? Economic autonomy and effective, permanent sovereignty or
control over natural resources? Preservation of ethno-cultural identity?
3. Does self-determination include the right of a people to secede
from a state?
4. Which people constitute the "self' entitled to make determina-
tions? Must the "self" embrace an entire population within a particular
territory? If a group within a population may exercise the right, may sub-
groups assert the right as well? How can non-sovereign groups of people
already possess a "right" of self-determination under international law if
31. Valletta Report on Peaceful Settlement, supra note 27, at 386.
32. Id. (emphasis added).
33. Copenhagen Document, supra note 30, 1 32, at 1318.
34. See, e.g., WAMBAUGH, supra note 9, at 27.
1991
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
they are still seeking the legal status to determine their selfhood? If sub-
groups can be "selves," should the right be limited to well-defined nation-
alities? Or to "national minorities," at least to those minorities outside
the scope of the CSCE? How are they to be defined? What are the crite-
ria of eligibility? Size of the group? Power or influence? Cultural homoge-
neity? Historical purity? Economic viability? Subjective factors such as
shared perceptions of group identity? Should percentage of support
among a population be a criterion? Active support alone?
5. If multiple criteria are appropriate for defining the "self," how are
they to be applied in concrete cases? What about Albanians in the Ko-
sovo region of Yugoslavia? Afrikaaners in South Africa? The Kurds,
spread among three states? Irish Catholics in Northern Ireland? Corsi-
cans in France? The Basques in Spain? In France? In Idaho? Native
American tribes? Newly organized tribes? Hispanics in Los Angeles or
Miami?
6. May a sub-group opt out of the larger group's exercise of self-de-
termination? The Soviet Republics having achieved external self-determi-
nation, what right of self-determination exists for Russian or other minor-
ities within the new states? Does the existence of neighboring Russia, to
which those Russian minorities could migrate, weaken their claim for
greater autonomy in the newly independent states?
7. Does self-determination include a right of internal democratiza-
tion? What, precisely, is the difference between internal self-determina-
tion and democracy? Does the right to self-determination imply broader
human rights protections against encroachment by local authority?
Would it entitle people to religious freedom in a theocracy?
8. If people may determine themselves to be truly independent of
outside interference, how, logically, can the control and authority the peo-
ple thereby establish be subject to any human rights standards or other
external appraisal without their consent? Would not a full right of self-
determination logically require an attitude of cultural relativism that ac-
cepts any internal practice, however barbarous, which has been "deter-
mined" by a particular group of people?
9. By what process may self-determination be exercised? Does the
principle of nonviolence apply? Must a people first exhaust peaceful rem-
edies before using force? Must they exhaust multilateral remedies?
10. To what extent may a people legitimately enlist outside support
or intervention to facilitate their self-determination? Does implementa-
tion of the right of self-determination in one state justify humanitarian
intervention by other states?s"
35. Paradoxically, such support may thereby threaten the exercise of true self-determi-
nation. John Stuart Mill and other purists have argued that a principle of non-intervention
is therefore a necessary condition for people to be truly free; they must achieve freedom by
themselves. Thus, a nation must be free of all foreign interference in order to engage in
internal self-determination of its political, economic and cultural affairs. A contrary argu-
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To be sure, community pronouncements and state practice have
helped answer many of these questions, but the legacy of accepted and
reliable authority is still meager. The term "self-determination" still
means many different things to many different peoples (or selves).38 De-
spite several decades of efforts to clarify the standards, there is unfortu-
nately little prospect of international agreement in the near future. For
example, the criteria for recognition of the "self" entitled to exercise self-
determination are unsettled. Unfortunately, the most compelling criterion
may be the extent to which a group of people is prepared to use force.
Moreover, an insidious notion of cultural relativism inhibits what might
seem to be a natural relationship between self-determination and human
rights standards. 7
Also, there is still no agreement on whether the right to self-determi-
nation extends to secession and other acts by people in self-governing ter-
ritories. On the one hand, the right has been vindicated in a few self-
governing territories such as the Soviet Union, paradoxically without the
compulsion of the CSCE process. Post-colonial statements that purported
to insulate independent states from claims of self-determination s ' are
very questionable today. On the other hand, the general practice of states
opposes an extension of the right to people in self-governing territories. 9
States understandably fear the threat to their sovereignty, and the global
community as a whole fears the instability and potential violence inher-
ent in the right. Hence, the inviolability of boundaries has become virtu-
ally an axiom of international relations, especially among governments of
former non-self-governing territories. The result can be viewed as either a
ment, however, is that full self-determination is not a necessary condition for freedom, and
therefore, invited or otherwise permissible humanitarian intervention by outside forces does
not necessarily impair a people's freedom to exercise self-determination. For an excellent
discussion of Mill's theory, see TES6N, supra note 6, at 26.
36. "The concept of self-determination cries for definition, and few agree on its con-
tent." BARRY CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1236 (1991).
37. See, e.g., Jerome Elkind, Remarks, Self-Determination: The Cases of Fiji, New
Caledonia, Namibia, and the Western Sahara, 1988 AM. Soc. INT'L L. PROC. 431.
38. For example, the Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 24, carves out a
major exception to "the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples," as
follows:
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or
encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part,
the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States
conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and
self-determination of peoples as described above and thus possessed of a gov-
ernment representing the whole people belonging to the territory without dis-
tinction as to race, creed or colour.
Id. at 123-24. As a statement of the principle of non-intervention, this provision has contin-
uing validity, but as a statement purporting to insulate self-governing territories from inter-
nal self-determination, the provision is questionable.
39. Ved P. Nanda, Self-Determination Under International Law: Validity of Claims to
Secede, 13 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 257, 271-74 (1981).
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double standard 40 - an external right obtains in non-self-governing terri-
tories but not in self-governing territories - or simply a customary defi-
nition of self-determination as "decolonization."
Critics of a right of self-determination oppose it also for historical
and institutional reasons. They argue that the right is little more than a
battle cry which has failed to promote democracy. Furthermore, it has
fostered nationalistic demagoguery,' 1 specious forms of multicultural-
ism,' and the construction of "improbable 'nation states' " " that lack an
adequate civic culture. Consequently, traditional values of social assimila-
tion and integration are sacrificed while both nations and world order are
fragmented. In an era of ethnic and irredentist strife these dangers seem
particularly pernicious.
Whether or not one agrees with such criticism, it is difficult to avoid
skepticism about relying heavily on diplomatic discourse to vindicate
claims of self-determination. United Nations-organized talks between
Greek and Turkish Cypriots collapsed after the introduction of rhetoric
about self-determination. 4' To be sure, recognition of the right has been
generally effective in facilitating decolonization and providing a frame-
work for limited multilateral settlement of competing claims. What has
been missing until recently, however, is an effective community process
for more precise rule-clarification, fact-finding and mediation to imple-
ment values underlying the right.'
40. AKEHURST, supra note 5, at 253.
41. SCHAEFFER, supra note 10, at 255.
42. For a trenchant commentary on the threat posed by identifying multiculturalism
with group separatism in a national society, see ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR. THE DISUNITING
OF AMERICA: REFLECTIONS ON A MULTICULTURAL SocmrY (1991). See also Arthur Schlesinger,
Jr., The Cult of Ethnicity, Good and Bad: A historian argues that multiculturalism threat-
ens the ideal that binds America, TIME, July 8, 1991, at 14. That identification, "crystallizes
the differences, magnifies tensions, intensifies hostilities." Rather than an aspiration of E
pluribus unum, "[tihe balance shifts from unum to pluribus."
43. James Clad, 'Democratic' Unraveling in Third World, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
July 24, 1991, at 19.
44. A GLOBAL AGENDA: ISSUES BEFORE THE 46TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NA-
TIONS 53 (John Tessitore & Susan Wolfson eds., 1991)[hereinafter GLOBAL AGENDA].
45. A leading authority wrote in 1972 what has remained true for nearly two decades:
Particularly where it involves the emergence of new states on the world
scene or the reshaping of old ones, self-determination is obviously a matter of
legitimate international concern. The problem, to which no satisfactory answer
has as yet been produced, is how one sets about regularizing and bringing
under international control ... essentially a right of revolution, justified by an
appeal to principles of higher law ....
It would be a wholly new departure if norms were to be established by
which claims to self-determination could be evaluated and the Assembly, the
Security Council, or some other newly created international agency were em-
powered to take authoritative decisions, implemented in part, perhaps, through
the elaboration of a collective process of recognition by the international
community.
Rupert Emerson, Self-Determination, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 459, 474 (1971).
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II. HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
The right of a state to intervene in another state's territory for hu-
manitarian reasons has deep philosophical and historical roots. For exam-
ple, Emerich Vattel, who greatly influenced American revolutionaries in
their exercise of self-determination against the British Crown, argued in
1758:
If a prince, by violating the fundamental laws, gives his subjects a
lawful cause for resisting him; if, by his insupportable tyranny, he
brings on a national revolt against him, any foreign power may right-
fully give assistance to an oppressed people who ask for its aid.'
Contemporary sources for a right of intervention include moral philoso-
phy,4 7 human rights law, and state responsibility for the lives and prop-
erty of nationals.
A limited history of state practice reveals a number of military expe-
ditions that were undertaken ostensibly for humanitarian reasons. Russia
intervened on behalf of Christians in Bulgaria, Turkey, Bosnia and Her-
zegovina during the 1870's, and in the Balkans during the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries."" India intervened to aid Bangladesh's self-de-
termination, 9 France intervened in the Central African Republic,5" and
four African States intervened in the Liberian Civil War.5" On the other
hand, humanitarian justifications of such abatement actions as those un-
dertaken by the United States in the Dominican Republic,"2 Grenada, 53
and Panama5 have been controversial.
Self-help measures or missions to rescue nationals held hostage or
46. Emerich Vattel, III LAW OF NATIONS 131 (Fenwick trans., 1964).
47. See TES6N, supra note 6.
48. Id. at 157-58.
49. Id. at 179; Ved P. Nanda, Self-Determination in International Law: The Tragic
Tale of Two Cities - Islamabad (West Pakistan) and Dacca (East Pakistan), 66 AM. J.
INT'L L. 321 (1972); Thomas M. Franck & Nigel S. Rodley, After Bangladesh: The Law of
Humanitarian Intervention by Military Force, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 275 (1973).
50. TES6N, supra note 6, at 175.
51. See Robert A. Friedlander, The Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention: UN
Precedents, US Policy and the Liberian Civil War, INT'L PRACTITIONER'S NOTEBOOK, June
1991, at 29.
52. Ved P. Nanda, The United States' Action in the 1965 Dominican Crisis: Impact on
World Order - Part 1, 43 DENv. L. J. 439 (1966).
53. Compare TES6N, supra note 6, at 188. See also Fernando Tes6n & Fernando Dos-
wald-Beck, The Legality of the U.S. Intervention in Grenada, 31 NErH. INT'L L. REV. 35
(1984); Christopher C. Joyner, Reflections on the Lawfulness of Invasion, 78 AM. J. INT'L L.
131 (1984); John N. Moore, Grenada and the International Double Standard, Id. at 145;
Detlev F. Vagts, International Law under Time Pressure: Grading the Grenada Take-
Home Examination, id. at 169.
54. See Anthony D'Amato, The Invasion of Panama Was a Lawful Response to Tyr-
anny, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 516 (1990); Tom J. Farer, Panama: Beyond the Charter Paradigm,
id. at 503; Ved P. Nanda, The Validity of United States Intervention in Panama under
International Law, id. at 494; Jennifer Miller, Note, International Intervention - The
United States Invasion of Panama, 31 HARV. INT'L L.J. 633 (1990).
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otherwise endangered on foreign territory resemble humanitarian inter-
vention in the classic sense. They rely at least as much on self-defense
and national security justifications as humanitarian ones. Examples of
rescue missions include the American/Belgian air lifts in the Congo dur-
ing the early 1960's;15 the raid on the Entebbe airport by Israeli comman-
dos;"' President Carter's ill-fated helicopter operation to rescue hostages
in Iran; 7 the intervention in Grenada;5 and most recently, rescue of U.S.
nationals during the Liberian Civil War. 9
Like self-determination, humanitarian intervention has been fraught
with ambiguity. For example:
1. What is "humanitarian?" One state's humanitarian jihad is a vic-
tim state's invasion. Human rights standards are often subject to varying
interpretations and national security exceptions.
2. Does the term "humanitarian" embrace only interventions in the
nineteenth century sense espoused by Vattel? That is, is intervention hu-
manitarian only when its purpose is to protect residents in the territory
of another state from human rights deprivations? If so, what magnitude
or patterns of deprivation justify intervention? Do only deprivations of
the most fundamental human rights justify intervention?
3. Does the term also embrace self-help or rescue missions on behalf
of the intervening state's own nationals in the territory of another state?
If so, under what circumstances and according to what criteria? May a
state undertake a rescue mission only if the other state is unable or un-
willing to protect the first state's nationals? To what extent must the in-
tervening State exhaust peaceful alternatives in an emergency? In a res-
cue mission, does it matter whether those to be rescued are primarily
citizens of the intervening state?
4. Do the nature, duration, purposes and outcome of humanitarian
intervention matter? Does a principle of proportionality apply?
Unlike self-determination, the very existence of a right of humanita-
rian intervention is controversial. Justification for any intervention in for-
eign territory must be found either in a broad reading of Article 2(4) of
the United Nations Charter, 0 or in an exception to that provision. Al-
55. Harold L. Weisberg, Note, The Congo Crisis 1964: A Case Study in Humanitarian
Intervention, 12 VA. J. INT'L L. 261 (1972).
56. See United Nations: Security Council Debate and Draft Resolutions Concerning the
Operation to Rescue Hijacked Hostages at the Entebbe Airport, reprinted in, 15 I.L.M.
1224 (1976).
57. N.Y. TIMES, April 25, 1980, at Al; id. April 26, 1980, at Al.
58. Moore, supra note 53, at 149.
59. Friedlander, supra note 51.
60. The Article reads as follows:
Article 2(4).
All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
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though Article 2(4) has often been ignored by states - its "high minded
resolve" still "mocks us from the grave"'" - the essential message of re-
stricting the threat or use of force remains a basic principle of interna-
tional relations. We must take Article 2(4) seriously. It still provides the
simplest expression of community expectations about non-intervention.
The language of Article 2(4) does, of course, provide a margin for
arguing that some instances of humanitarian intervention are acceptable.
For example, Entebbe-style "mop up" operations and lightning com-
mando strikes to rescue hostages of whatever nationality may be accept-
able. When prompt withdrawal follows, such actions do not significantly
involve force "against the territorial integrity or political independence of
any state." 2 Such actions would therefore seem to be legitimate under
Article 2(4). Some argue, however, that the original intent of the Charter
was to prohibit all intervention in foreign territory that is not otherwise
authorized."2
One writer makes the intriguing suggestion that if a state risks the
lives of its citizens to achieve humanitarian ends, it ordinarily should not
withdraw quickly. If there have to be intervening states in the real world,
they should occupy the foreign territory long enough to ensure lasting
achievement of humanitarian ends, the language of Article 2(4) notwith-
standing. "If we believe that in certain ineffable cases the dangerous ex-
pedient of humanitarian intervention should be attempted, we should
concede the probable necessity of reconstructing the political order that
created the imperious necessity." 4 Thus, although multilateral recon-
struction of political order is generally preferable, when unilateral hu-
manitarian intervention does take place, the intervenor may need to stay
for a prolonged period of time before it can properly withdraw from the
foreign territory.
State intervention in the territory of another state in order to imple-
ment a basic purpose of the United Nations may not be inconsistent with
the Charter. Far from acting "in any other manner inconsistent with the
Purposes of the United Nations," 5 the intervening state's actions are ac-
tually authorized by other Charter provisions. An example of this would
be intervention for the purpose of enhancing self-determination, which is
arguably sanctioned by Article 1. This argument might seem to be espe-
cially compelling as a justification for intervention to protect a majority
Nations.
U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4).
61. Thomas M. Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4)? Or Changing Norms Governing the
Use of Force By States, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 809 (1970).
62. U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4).
63. Louis Henkin, Use of Force: Law and United States Policy, in RIGHT V. MIGHT 37,
39 (2d ed. 1991).
64. Tom J. Farer, Human Rights in Law's Empire: The Jurisprudence War, 85 AM. J.
INT'L L. 117, 127 (1991).
65. U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4).
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people from violence and other violations of fundamental human rights
by a minority, as in Bangladesh (East Pakistan) before it gained indepen-
dence from Karachi."6 The most common counter-argument, however, is
that the Charter allows no human rights exceptions to its prohibition on
the threat or use of force.
6 7
The only explicit exceptions to Article 2(4) in the Charter are found
in Chapters VII and VIII. Chapter VII contains provisions for self-de-
fense or forceful measures authorized by the Security Council. Chapter
VIII allows enforcement measures by regional arrangements or agencies
authorized by the Security Council.
It has been argued that the justification for humanitarian interven-
tion by states - "the right of governments to defend defenseless victims
of oppression" 8 - is philosophically the same as that for self-defense
under Article 51 of the Charter 9 - "the right of governments to defend
the lives and property of their nationals which are threatened by foreign
invasion. 70 There is, however, no accepted legal identification between
these two types of forceful action.
State practice before the U.N. Charter has led some to argue that the
drafters of Article 2(4) intended to preserve a customary "right" of hu-
manitarian intervention. The travaux preparatoires of the San Francisco
Conference are inconclusive on this point.71 Opposing arguments are that
there never was a customary right of humanitarian intervention, that Ar-
ticle 2(4) replaces any inconsistent custom, that the Charter elsewhere
establishes the only permissible exceptions to Article 2(4), and that a gen-
eral principle of nonintervention now applies, regardless of humanitarian
exigencies or acquiescence by states.7 ' Another argument suggests a cus-
tomary right of humanitarian intervention exists due to the Cold War
reality of a stalemated United Nations, that is, that because adoption of
Article 2(4) presupposed effective institutions, self-help measures are ac-
ceptable in the absence of these institutions.
66. One scholar has argued:
[T]he demands of self-determination [can be placed] above those of "territorial
integrity" and of a "non-interventionist" stand on the part of the United Na-
tions. For where violence is perpetrated by a minority to deprive a majority of
political, economic, social and cultural rights, the principles of "territorial in-
tegrity" and "non-intervention" should not be permitted to be used as a ploy
to perpetuate the political subjugation of the majority.
Nanda, supra note 49, at 336.
67. See, e.g., YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENSE 89 (1988).
("[N]othing in the Charter substantiates the right of one State to use force against another
under the guise of ensuring the implementation of human rights.").
68. Fernando Tes6n, Remarks, 84 AM. Soc. INT'L L. PROC. 195 (1990).
69. U.N. CHARTER art. 51 (confirming "the inherent right of individual or collective self
defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations .
70. Tes6n, supra note 68.
71. TES6N, supra note 6, at 130, 134, 136.
72. Seelan Brownlie, Humanitarian Intervention, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MOD-
ERN WORLD 217 (John Norton Moore ed., 1974).
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Even if the Charter preserves a customary right of humanitarian in-
tervention, inter-temporal construction of subsequent state practice does
not easily support its continued existence. One analysis of post-Charter
interventions by states asserts that, "there is not a single case ... where
one state has intervened in another for the exclusive purpose of halting
mass murder, much less any other gross violations of human rights." 3
Forceful actions by India in East Pakistan, Tanzania in Uganda, and Vi-
etnam in Cambodia might have been justified on grounds of humanita-
rian intervention. Instead they were justified on the basis of self-defense
from armed attack, "a claim not one of them could persuasively sustain.
Their choice hardly suggests confidence in the exculpatory power of hu-
manitarian motive."'
4
Unilateral intervention to support internal self-determination, de-
mocracy, or fundamental human rights is highly questionable on policy
grounds as well. 7 5 Intervention may have the undesirable effect of inviting
prolonged foreign hegemony, as in the Syrian and Israeli interventions in
Lebanon.76 A rule restricted to counterintervention in support of demo-
cratic forces runs the same risk. Thus, "a rule allowing humanitarian in-
tervention ... is a general license to vigilantes and opportunists to resort
to hegemonical intervention." 7 Although this observation may be more
colorful than accurate, it does serve as a general reminder that despite its
charitable sound, humanitarian intervention can readily mask an illegal
use or threat of use of force. A right to intervene for humanitarian rea-
sons is dangerously subject to abuse.78
Several publicists have collaborated in formulating a list of criteria
that, ideally, would define the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention.
These criteria, drawn from the laws of human rights and armed conflicts,
include the following: immediacy and extent of a specific threat to funda-
mental human rights; exhaustion of alternative remedies; good faith at-
tempt to secure an authoritative invitation from the target state; minimal
effect of intervention on authority structures in target state; minimal req-
uisite force; relative disinterestedness of the intervening state or states;
prompt disengagement after completion of the interventino; and full re-
porting to the Security Council and, as appropriate, regional organiza-
73. Farer, supra note 64, at 121.
74. Id. at 122.
75. See Oscar Schachter, The Legality of Pro-Democratic Invasion, 78 AM. J. INT'L L.
645 (1984); CATER & TRIMBLE, supra note 36, at 1236.
76. See Nicholas 0. Berry, The Conflict Between United States Intervention and Pro-
moting Democracy in the Third World, 60 TEMP. L. Q. 1015 (1987).
77. Ian Brownlie, Thoughts on Kind-Hearted Gunmen, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
AND THE UNITED NATIONS 147 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1973)[hereinafter HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION].
78. MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 423 (1977); Louis Henkin, Remarks, Biafra,
Bengal, and Beyond: International Responsibility and Genocidal Conflict 1972 AM. Soc'Y
INT'L L. PROC. 95, 96.
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tions.7 9 These criteria provide an excellent basis for multilateral prescrip-
tion, though unfortunately not an accurate description of state practice.
III. ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS DURING THE COLD WAR
Most commentators prefer multilateral or collective intervention to
unilateral intervention. Theoretically, multilateral action provides a more
reliable consensus of support, checks abuses, and better ensures that in-
tervention is warranted. Unfortunately, multilateral efforts were greatly
inhibited, if not stymied, by Cold War politics. Vetoes of important mea-
sures by Permanent Members of the Security Council paralyzed the
United Nations. The major powers simply kept self-determination issues
off the multilateral agenda, except those whose airing served their respec-
tive foreign policy objectives. Whatever its legal status, unilateral action
frequently became the only moral alternative to passive tolerance of bru-
tality and irresponsibility.8 0
The United Nations has played an instrumental role in the process of
decolonization, and has helped stabilize newly independent regimes. 1
The United Nations has adopted resolutions supporting claims for self-
governance, imposed sanctions against racist regimes in Rhodesia and
South Africa, supervised plebiscites, provided a forum for self-determina-
tion movements, received reports and inquiries from trusteeships and
other non-self-governing territories, adopted criteria for testing the extent
of self-governance, provided technical assistance to people on the path to
independence, and installed military troops to protect democratic
processes. As Secretary-General, Dag HammarskjSld, in particular, exer-
cised truly daring leadership in support of independence and of the inter-
ests of newly independent states.
On the other hand, the United Nations proved to be quite ineffective
in post-colonial situations. It failed to predict ethnic conflicts, to give ef-
fect to the aspirations of people in the nominal "republics" of federations
or unions, to mediate peaceful settlements of conflicts, to respond effec-
tively to acts of secession such as those in the Congo (Katanga), Nigeria
(Biafra), and Pakistan (Bangladesh). At least on New York's East River,
self-determination was primarily a metaphor for independence, not for
secession of people after independence nor for facilitating subsequent po-
litical and social change in self-governing states.
79. Richard Lillich, Humanitarian Intervention: A Reply to Ian Brownlie and a Plea
for Constructive Alternatives, in Moore, supra note 72, at 249.
80. "(I]f we cannot perfect, as a minimum, a system of humanitarian intervention, we
have lost our humanity. If we sit passively by while the Ibos suffer genocide, we have for-
feited our right to regain it." W. Michael Reisman, Humanitarian Intervention to Protect
the Ibos, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION, supra note 77, at 195.
81. "The U.N. served as the catalyst for the revolution of decolonization." Brian
Urguhart, The United Nations and its Discontents, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Mar. 15, 1990, at 11.
The summary that follows in the text is drawn from Louis HENKIN ET AL., supra note 26, at
284.
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The record of the United Nations as an instrument of humanitarian
intervention was also negligible throughout the Cold War period. A pre-
vailing interpretation of Article 2(7) of the Charter was that intervention
by the organization for humanitarian reasons would be an invasion of a
state's domestic jurisdiction. While regional organizations have assumed
some leadership, such as the fledgling Organization of Eastern Caribbean
States (OECS) in requesting U.S. troops in Grenada,82 their freedom from
superpower influence may be questioned. Furthermore, their immediate
delegation of enforcement authority to nearby military powers illustrates
the weakness of the United Nations system. General Assembly resolutions
advocating material and moral support for national liberation movements
in colonial territories stopped short of condoning humanitarian interven-
tion. Finally, the United Nations has responded infrequently to unilateral
acts of intervention within the superpowers' spheres of influence.
In sum, the United Nations was seldom given an opportunity to re-
spond effectively to issues of self-determination and humanitarian inter-
vention. The U.N. was limited by East-West spheres of influence that
were impervious to multilateral investigation and response. Moreover, the
United Nations was constrained by the reluctance of states, particularly
newly independent ones, to recognize a post-colonial right of self-deter-
mination or a responsibility for multilateral humanitarian intervention on
behalf of dissident groups.
IV. THE NEW REALITY OF A COMMUNITY OF POWER
Political conditions which prevented international institutions from
playing a greater role during the Cold War have changed. Although the
millennium has not yet arrived, the bipolar stalemate has ended.
Whatever the historical explanation, East and West have begun working
together to resolve fundamental issues, and to enlist the participation of
multilateral institutions and processes. The Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) specifically recognized, "with satisfaction
the growing role of the United Nations in world affairs and its increasing
effectiveness."8 3 The Gulf War, in particular, stimulated East-West coop-
eration and practical decision-making within the United Nations. Al-
though the Gulf War was unique in many respects, it nevertheless
portends an accelerated emergence of a community of power, in the Wil-
sonian sense, to replace the bi-polar balance-of-power system. This
emerging community of power also portends, however, a proliferation of
self-determination and intervention issues that will test the strength of
multilateralism. The set of circumstances that gave rise to collective ac-
tion in the Gulf War will probably not be repeated. The disparate inter-
ests of the Permanent Members of the Security Council converged fortui-
82. See Text of Reagan's Announcement of Invasion, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1983, at
A16. For a critique of the OECS's involvement in Grenada, see Joyner, supra note 53, at
135-38.
83. Paris Charter, supra note 27, at 198.
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tously to produce agreement on enforcement action and humanitarian
measures following the war. In Europe and the Soviet Union particularly,
the lid is off the cauldron of bubbling ethnic, irredentist, and other na-
tionalist animosities. 4
Fortunately, a rejuvenated United Nations is also part of this envi-
ronment. It is now a body capable of consolidating a community of power
to address a formidable agenda of disputes, feuds, and conflicts. The
United Nations is no longer, in one poison-pen image, a "baroque appara-
tus [in which] governments might, without abating their transgressions,
go to church. 8 5 Instead of a place of sanctimonious ceremony, the United
Nations is becoming, "a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in
the attainment of [their] common ends.""6 As a service institution in the
post-Cold War era, the United Nations can better facilitate self-determi-
nation, pre-empt unilateral humanitarian intervention by states, and ini-
tiate its own form of intervention and dispute settlement when necessary.
Three years ago, a major study advised the United Nations to "do
less but do it better." The study observed that:
[T]he Security Council does not need to solve, or even ease, all of the
world's problems to be valuable. It simply has to make a positive dif-
ference in resolving a few dangerous conflicts. Even one clear victory
would begin to restore public faith in its potential.
87
Now the five permanent members of the Security Council are cooperat-
ing, and the public perceives that the Council scored its "one clear vic-
tory" in the Gulf War.8 8 The United Nations as a whole can seize the
84. Mideast Diplomacy: Excerpts from Bush's Address to General Assembly: For a
'Pax Universalis,' N.Y. TimaS, Sept. 24, 1991, at A14[hereinafter Pax Universalis]. In his
remarks, President Bush referred variously to the "resumption of history," the "revival of
history," and the "renewal of history" to free and invigorate people in the post-Cold War
era. "Communism held history captive for years, and it suspended ancient disputes and it
suppressed ethnic rivalries, nationalist aspirations and old prejudices." Id.
85. Hazzard, Reflections: Breaking Faith - 1, THE NEW YORKER, Sept. 25, 1989, at 63,
96 (an acid indictment of the United Nations by a former employee).
86. U.N. CHARTER art. 1(4).
87. See A SUCCESSOR VISION: THE UNITED NATIONS OF TOMORROW 113 (Peter J.
Fromuth ed., 1988)[hereinafter Fromuth].
88. Brzezinski has commented:
After years of ineptitude marked by Cold War divisions and unwillingness to
condemn Third World aggressors, the United Nations reclaimed a major role
in international relations. In legitimizing an international coalition that cut
across established alliances, it helped bring about the defeat of Iraq. From the
beginning the Security Council dominated the handling of the crisis, and its
early moves quickly isolated Iraq diplomatically and economically. Most mem-
bers of the General Assembly disapproved of Iraq's invasion, with its implicit
threat to their own national existence, and allowed the great powers to work
out a solution. Both the Arab League and the nonaligned movement were
hopelessly divided and without resources to act.
With each successive step, and the coalition's obvious intention to persevere,
pivotal states reversed deeply established policy positions: Turkey abandoned
its aversion to intervening in any Arab conflict that did not directly involve its
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moment to confirm its intended role of "building consensus among major
players in the world scene."8 9 The Gulf War established the ability of the
Security Council to repel aggression, restore international peace and se-
curity, impose comprehensive sanctions, and see them enforced.90 The
credibility of the United Nations as a whole is thereby increased.
The Gulf War is of particular relevance to this article. It originated
as a vindication of self-determination, and collective acts of humanitarian
intervention were carried out in its aftermath. Security Council Resolu-
tion 688,91 adopted after the Gulf War, exemplifies the reality of a compe-
tent United Nations. For the first time, the Security Council determined
that a massive flow of refugees, or displaced persons in their own terri-
tory, namely the Kurds in Iraq, threatened international peace and secur-
ity. Resolution 688 specifically condemned the repression of the Iraqi ci-
vilian population, particularly the Kurds; and it provided for, "immediate
access by international humanitarian organizations to all those in need of
assistance."9 " The resolution also incorporated a detailed memorandum of
understanding between the United Nations and the Iraqi government.
Precise terms of United Nations intervention were set out, including the
establishment of Humanitarian Centers (UNHUCs) in areas designated
by the United Nations.9" Resolution 688 did not purport to decide any
issues of self-determination involving Iraqi minorities, nor did it support
military intervention for humanitarian reasons. It nevertheless broke new
ground.
United Nations action on behalf of the Kurds was an extension of the
impressive regime of authority and control by which the Security Council
responded to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the first time one member of
the United Nations had purported to annex another by use of force. The
own security; Syria dropped its anti-Western stance and joined with the "im-
perialists" to topple an Arab rival; Iran did nothing to interfere with U.S.-
engineered military operations, and it impounded the Iraqi military aircraft
seeking a haven from the coalition's bombing; and Israel exercised un-
characteristic restraint, absorbing Iraqi Scud missile attacks and relying on
U.S.-manned batteries of Patriot antiballistic missiles to protect its territory,
thereby frustrating Saddam's attempt to transform the Gulf War into a new
Arab-Israeli war.
With widespread support in the United Nations, countries like Jordan, Yemen,
Libya, Algeria and the Sudan who tilted toward Iraq dared not challenge the
blockade.
Zbignew Brzezinski, Selective Global Commitment, 70 FOREIGN AFF. 1, 8
(1991).
89. Fromuth, supra note 87, at 113.
90. Bruce Russett & James S. Sutterlin, The U.N. in a New World Order, 70 FOREIGN
AFF. 69, 82-83 (1991).
91. U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2982d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/688 (1991), reprinted in 30
I.L.M. 858 (1991) [hereinafter S/RES/6881.
92. Id. 1 3. "Such new world law comes as a warmly welcome aspect of the new world
order." The Law Learns From the Kurds, N.Y. TIMES, April 14, 1991, at D18.
93. Memorandum of Understanding, U.N. Doc. No. S/22663, reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 860
(1990).
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Security Council resolutions disclose a significant human rights orienta-
tion in the response to the invasion. 4 Foe example, Resolution 66495 de-
manded that Iraq permit and facilitate the immediate departure from
Iraq and Kuwait of third-country nationals. Resolution 677"6 struck a
theme of self-determination, condemning "attempts by Iraq to alter the
demographic composition of the population of Kuwait."97 Resolution
67898 authorized the use of "all necessary means" 99 to uphold and imple-
ment the resolutions," and requested all states to support the measures
taken under the provision.'00 It also authorized the necessary means to,
"restore international peace and security in the area."' 1 Resolution
687,102 which set forth armistice terms, enlisted Iraqi cooperation with the
International Committee of the Red Cross to facilitate the repatriation of
all Kuwaiti and third-country nationals.1 08 During the Gulf War other
United Nations bodies supplemented the Security Council's work. Gen-
eral Assembly Resolution 45/170'" demanded Iraqi compliance with in-
ternational humanitarian law, and the Commission on Human Rights ad-
dressed allegations of Iraqi government abuses of its own citizens.
Opinions differ on the validity and independence of the United Na-
tions' role in compelling Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait and to comply
with international law. Some observers dismiss the Security Council's
twelve Gulf resolutions as little more than fig leaves to mask the naked
power of the United States and its Coalition partners.0 5 Others, however,
place emphasis on the collective process through which the resolutions
were adopted. These observers note the unprecedented cooperation in
this kind of a crisis among Permanent Members of the Security Council,
and the near-unanimity of the Security Council decisions. The United
States, France and the United Kingdom strongly influenced the Security
Council resolutions, but accepted the political nature of the process.
Members have always been inclined to speak and vote their wills.' 0 6 Thus,
94. S/RES/660, 661, 662, 664, 665, 666, 667, 669, 670, 674, 677, 678, reprinted in U. N.
DEP'T OF PUB. INFO., United Nations Security Council Resolutions Relating to the Situation
between Iraq and Kuwait DPI/l104fRev. 1-40059, Feb. 1991; S/RES/687, reprinted in 30
I.L.M. 847 (1991).
95. S/RES/664, supra note 94.
96. S/RES/677, supra note 94.
97. Id. preamble.
98. S/RES/678, supra note 94.
99. Id. v 2.
100. Id. 3.
101. Id. 1 2.
102. S/RES/687, supra note 94.
103. Id. 1 30.
104. G. A. Res. 45/170 (1990).
105. See Burns H. Weston, Security Council Resolution 678 and Persian Gulf Decision
Making: Precarious Legitimacy, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 516 (1991).
. 106. Oscar Schachter, United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 542
(1991); Eugene V. Rostow, Until What? Enforcement Action or Collective Self Defense?, 85
AM. J. INT'L L. 506 (1991).
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when the global community dialed 911, the United States may have been
the first to answer. The U.S., however, did not simply grab its musket and
run off to the emergency without consulting and gaining the approval of
diverse members of the United Nations family.
Whatever the role of the United States, the Gulf War experience
demonstrated the significance of going through the United Nations drill.
Only by doing so can a state expect to enlist broad support for even the
most commendable acts of principle, such as deterring aggression and re-
storing the peace. If the intent of the United States was didactic, to
demonstrate that aggression does not pay, the only way to do so effec-
tively was to multilateralize a military response. The resulting Coalition
of forces contrasted markedly with unilateral U.S. interventions in Gre-
nada and Panama, which never gained widespread support.
Resolution 688 specifically "recall[s]' 10 7 Article 2(7) of the Charter.108
Presumably, then, the Security Council's highly interventionist program
on behalf of the Kurds in northern Iraq is deemed to be consistent with
Article 2(7). Thus, the misery of a suppressed population is no longer
deemed "essentially within the domestic jurisdiction"' 0 9 of a national gov-
ernment. Large-scale deprivations of human rights unquestionably
threaten international peace and security; hence, they engage the Security
Council's powers under Chapter VII. The Security Council's message of
involvement recognizing the international implications of severe depriva-
tion of human rights could not be clearer. Thus, Resolution 688 presaged
a larger role for humanitarian intervention under international authority.
A narrow interpretation of Article 2(7) might also suggest that the
Charter may question a state's use of force domestically. This argument
at least challenges the state's right to quash an expression of self-determi-
nation by a group of people well on the way to independence recognized
under international law. Of course, Article 2(4) speaks only to the threat
or use of force by States in their international relations. Ordinarily, that
provision would not seem to constrain a state from using force within its
territory against its own people, even though suppression of self-determi-
nation might otherwise be "inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations.""l 0 In exceptional circumstances, however, a group of people
completing a process of acknowledged self-determination may claim a
limited international personality. Threat or use of force against them
107. S/RES/688, supra note 91, pmbl.
108. The U.N. Charter states:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Na-
tions to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdic-
tion of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settle-
ment under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the
application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.
U.N. CHARTER art. 2(7).
109. Id.
110. Id. art. 2(4).
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would then fall within the prohibitions of Article 2(4). An early example
was the Security Council's decision in 1947 concerning the Netherlands
and the incipient state of Indonesia.11
Once the reality of an operational alternative under the U.N. Charter
to unilateral measures is widely accepted, greater attention could turn to
the task of making those alternatives more effective. As precedent, the
United Nations has resolved numerous geopolitical disputes. For exam-
ple, the International Court of Justice has successfully adjudicated nu-
merous maritime boundaries in recent years. The U.N.'s pivotal roles in
arranging a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and helping bring peace
to El Salvador are acclaimed; its involvement in ending civil strife in the
Western Sahara, Cyprus and Cambodia may yet bring lasting peace and
stability to those regions.
There is, however, room for improvement. The United Nations failed
to respond effectively to Iraqi threats or forestall the use of force that
initiated the Kuwaiti crisis. The Secretary-General's efforts to mediate a
solution to the Kuwaiti crisis before the January 15, 1991 deadline were
handicapped by the terms of twelve Security Council resolutions. These
gave him almost no flexibility in trying to gain an Iraqi withdrawal from
occupied Kuwait.112 As another example, questionable draftsmanship and
supervision invited mischief by the French government in the Secretary-
General's mediation of the Rainbow Warrior Affairl's between New Zea-
land and France. Cambodia's killing fields were both physical and diplo-
matic as long as the Permanent Members of the Security Council re-
mained unwilling to cooperate in a common plan of action. At the
pinnacle of formal dispute resolution, the World Court invited jurispru-
dential criticism in the Nicaragua Case"" by what some viewed as a
rather extravagant application of custom in response to sensitive issues of
intervention.
None of these examples indicates a fundamental incompetence of the
United Nations in either a general or technical sense of that word. What
the examples do suggest, however, is a reliance of the United Nations on
adherence by states to principles of good faith and cooperation. The ex-
amples above also illustrate the need to clarify the ground rules and
broaden the bases of decision-making, in order to achieve a true commu-
nity of power.
Clearly, the United Nations is constrained by financial and structural
111. 5 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 384 (Marjorie M. Whiteman, ed., 1965)(whether
the Netherlands violated international law by engaging in hostilities against Indonesia, at
the time in the process of achieving de facto independence).
112. See Lucia Mouat, United Nations' Multiple Roles at Odds in Confronting Gulf
Crisis, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 22, 1991, at 5.
113. New Zealand v. France, April 30, 1990 (text of subsequent arbitration available
from author).
114. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
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limitations. The Gulf War highlighted the need to maintain an endow-
ment of financial pledges and other mutual assistance under Article 49 of
the Charter. Money is needed in order to carry out more ambitious pro-
grams of humanitarian cooperation. Also, the Gulf War experience ampli-
fied debate about structural reforms, such as the composition of the Se-
curity Council. Serious consideration of such structural alternatives as
expansion of the permanent membership of the Security Council, or elim-
ination of the veto power, may therefore be needed in the new world or-
der. Passage of Resolution 688 illustrates the advisability of reconsidering
the current structure for making decisions under Chapter VII: only be-
cause of an abstention rather than a veto by China, a Permanent Mem-
ber, did the Resolution succeed.
Other international and regional bodies can play a more important
role. After all, the United Nations is not the sum and total of a commu-
nity of power. In the aftermath of the 1991 military coup in Haiti, for
example, the Organization of American States (OAS) established powers
of humanitarian intervention that permit the organization to take "any
measures" necessary to restore democracy in member states." 5 In its 1991
summit communique, the Group of Seven endorsed the post-Gulf war
model as a basis for collective intervention to alleviate human suffering."'
The European Community has assumed the role of mediator in civil
war disputes in Europe. The Community has provided fact-finders, ob-
server teams, and other facilities to help bring information and reason to
bear on national crises, beginning with the frustrating Croatian-Serbian
imbroglio in a thoroughly fragmented Yugoslavia." 7 In the Moscow Con-
cluding Document, the CSCE for the first time unanimously agreed to
conduct investigations of human rights abuses in member states even
without their consent.' Several states have called on international and
115. See N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1991, at A6.
116.
We note that the urgent and overwhelming nature of the humanitarian
problem in Iraq caused by violent oppression by the Government required ex-
ceptional action by the international community, following UNSCR 688. We
urge the UN and its affiliated agencies to be ready to consider similar action in
the future if the circumstances require it. The international community cannot
stand idly by in cases where widespread human suffering from famine, war,
oppression, refugee flows, disease or flood reaches urgent and overwhelming
proportions.
London Economic Summit Political Declaration: Strengthening the International Order,
July 16, 1991, WKLY Comp. PREs. Doc. 963, 964 (July 22, 1991).
117. See, eg., Alan Riding, Europeans' Hopes for a Yugoslav Peace Turn to Frustra-
tion, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 22, 1991, at E3.
118. Berlin Meeting on CSCE Council, 19-20 June, 1991, 30 I.L.M 1349 (1991). The
Moscow Concluding Document addresses the CSCE "human dimension." See text accompa-
nying and following note 27, supra. The document expands human rights-related commit-
ments of CSCE members and the Human Dimension Mechanism of the CSCE. The mecha-
nism involves a logical progression of steps for resolving human dimension issues within the
region, culminating, if necessary, in mandatory investigation by the CSCE. First, however, a
state may request that an expert mission visit its territory to provide good offices and medi-
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regional organizations to assist struggling new democracies in establishing
new institutions or in reviving dormant ones to protect human rights.
These states have also advocated rethinking the scope of the non-inter-
vention principle, in view of the new reality of collective initiatives. 1 9
V. TOWARD A STRONGER COMMUNITY OF POWER
Within a larger community of power, members of the United Nations
need to double their efforts to clarify the law of self-determination and
humanitarian intervention. They should also improve processes for sort-
ing out pertinent facts and reconciling opposing interpretations of those
rights, and encourage mediation or other peaceful techniques for settling
international disputes. It is still true today that, "No countervailing credo
yet confronts the unraveling logic of self-determination. No universal
mechanism exists to weigh the justice of competing ethnic claims. No in-
ternational authority is yet willing, let alone able, to save failing
sovereignties. 1 1
20
Although a "countervailing credo" to self-determination may not be
feasible or even advisable, the United Nations should clarify essential
rules and norms. The collapse of UN-organized talks between Greek and
Turkish Cypriots after introduction of self-determination rhetoric under-
scores the importance of a concerted effort to objectify and neutralize the
term. The General Assembly should also confront the jurisprudential ten-
sion between its human rights initiatives and principles of non-interfer-
ence. This might be undertaken by acting through the International Law
Commission. The organization needs to seek a more definitive answer to
the question: when, precisely, do human rights concerns become Chapter
ation services or undertake other means assigned by the state to resolve a particular
"human dimension" issue. The newly formulated mechanism invites all CSCE members to
exercise friendly persuasion as a means of encouraging another member state to request
such an expert mission. If the state refuses within a reasonable period of time, any six mem-
bers of the CSCE may convoke a fact-finding mission to the recalcitrant state even without
its consent. After completing an investigation (whether volutarily invited or mandatorily
imposed), the mission is instructed to prepare a report for submission to the CSCE's Com-
mittee of Senior Officials. In extraordinary circumstances, when time is of the essence, any
nine CSCE members may request the CSCE to convoke a mandatory mission without wait-
ing for the target state voluntarily to invite one. Letter from Ambassador Max M.
Kampelman to the author (Nov. 8, 1991).
119. Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering, Address at Willamette University (May 12,
1991)(stressing the need for the U.N. to devote more attention to ways of intervening in
states for of human rights purposes), in STATESMAN J. (Salem, Or.), May 13, 1991, at 2. See
also CHINA POST, July 18, 1991, at 4 (Austria, France and Germany call for relaxation of
principle of non-intervention to improve enforcement of human rights). See also Pax
Universalis, supra note 84.
120. Clad, supra note 43. See also Emerson, supra note 45, at 474, 475:
Because of the great variety of situations, problems and claims, the decisions
would undoubtedly have frequently to be of an ad hoc "political" nature ....
... On the face of it, it is desirable that the United Nations be empowered
to play a larger role in relation to the always hazardous issue of self-
determination.
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VII issues of international peace and security? Articles 1(3) and 55 are
reconcilable with Article 2(7), but their mutuality needs to be formulated
more explicitly and precisely.
Clarification of rules is, however, only a small part of the opportuni-
ties and responsibilities of a community of power. Improved mechanisms
and procedures for organizational initiatives may be even more impor-
tant. The United Nations Security Council might remain in session on a
daily, year-round basis, 2 ' in order to monitor global stability and curtail
crises while still incipient. An excellent example of the Security Council's
ability to monitor and respond to crises of self-determination was its im-
position of a mandatory, though unsanctioned, embargo on arms ship-
ments to Yugoslavia.122 This decision was built explicitly upon the prece-
dent of the Security Council's initiatives to control the flow of arms
during the Kuwait crisis preceding the Gulf War.
With greater financial resources, the Secretary-General could assume
a larger role in supporting Security Council initiatives and undertake in-
formation gathering and fact-finding, contingency planning, preventive
diplomacy, and support of regional dispute resolution. The Secretary-
General can act under either Article 98 or Article 99 of the Charter. 23 For
Example, under Article 98, the Secretary-General might make recommen-
dations to the Security Council for appropriate action under Chapter VII
of the Charter. A new office of Research and Collection of Information
(ORCI) could enhance the ability of the Secretariat to carry out its re-
sponsibilities under both Articles 98 and 99 of the Charter. Specifically,
the Secretariat can play a useful role in gathering facts and preparing
background studies before referring delicate self-determination issues to
the Security Council, as in the Yugoslavian crisis.
United Nations human rights bodies can play an expanded role in
investigating and addressing issues of self-determination and deprivation
of human rights. Foremost among these bodies is the U.N. Commission
on Human Rights, which assumed an active role in Kuwait and Iraq, as-
121. "The Security Council shall be so organized as to be able to function continu-
ously." U.N. CHARTER art. 28(1).
122. See N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1991, at A4.
123. Article 98.
The Secretary-General shall act in that capacity in all meetings of the
General Assembly, of the Security Council, of the Economic and Social Coun-
cil, and of the Trusteeship Council, and shall perform such other functions as
are entrusted to him by these organs. The Secretary-General shall make an
annual report to the General Assembly on the work of the Organization.
Article 99.
The Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council
any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international
peace and security.
U.N. CHARTER.
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sisted by the appointment of Special Rapporteurs."' Other pertinent
bodies include the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities," 5 the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination, 2 s and .the special committees established under the two
International Covenants on human rights. 2 7 Several types of human
rights mechanisms offer particular promise: working groups with indepen-
dent rapporteurs to address particular human rights issues (for example,
self-determination); special rapporteurs to examine conditions in specific
countries; committees to monitor compliance with human rights treaties,
especially those with optional mechanisms for individual complaints; the
Advisory Services program that provides technical assistance to states ex-
periencing human rights-related conflict; and public information pro-
grams to heighten awareness of human rights mechanisms."" More ambi-
tiously, the U.N. might establish a step-by-step process for investigating
humsn rights similar to the Human Dimension Mechanism of the CSCE.
The U.N. successfully supervised free elections in Namibia, Nicara-
gua, and Haiti. This led to the adoption by the 45th General Assembly of
a resolution that called upon the Secretary-General to establish a process
for responding to requests by states for electoral assistance. 2 9 The next
step might be to establish a standing United Nations electoral commis-
sion to assist in elections and the general process of internal self-determi-
nation. Free elections are, however, no guarantee of democracy or even
self-determination.
In mediating and resolving disputes that are bound to occur, five or-
ganizational tasks are essential: 1) searching for formulas to avoid and
resolve conflicts; Z) building consensus in whatever strategy is selected; 3)
conducting behind-the-scenes negotiations; 4) providing face-saving exits
from conflict; and 5) helping member states satisfy their obligations
under Articles 1(3) and 33130 of the Charter, by selecting the appropriate
124. HOWARD TOLLEY, JR., THE U.N. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 190 (1987); GLOBAL
AGENDA, supra note 44, at 192 (role in Kuwait and Iraq).
125. Resolution 8 (VIII) of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 42 U.N. ESCOR,
23d Sess., 930th mtg., Supp. No. 6, at 131, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/940 (1967)(specifically author-
izing the Sub-Commission to review situations that disclose a consistent pattern of human
rights violations).
126. See International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimi-
nation, Mar. 7, 1966, art. 8, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, 224.
127. See Covenants, supra note 23. The two committees are the Human Rights Com-
mittee (political and civil rights) and the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights.
128. GLOBAL AGENDA, supra note 44, at 172.
129. See THE UNITED NATIONS ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE
FORGOTTEN U.N.: AN INSIDE LOOK AT THE 45TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY 1 (1990). See generally
International Observation of Elections, 84 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 375 (1990).
130.
To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an
economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and
encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all
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mode of dispute resolution. It should be possible for the Secretariat to
respond routinely to popular claims for a greater measure of self-determi-
nation. An arrangement for on-going, third-party consultation might be
sufficient, and failing that, impartial review of popular claims and govern-
mental counterclaims.
The United Nations might establish a sort of multi-door interna-
tional courthouse, perhaps in the Hague or Geneva. Here, claims relating
to self-determination and intervention could be arbitrated or adjudicated.
A preliminary requirement might be recourse to mandatory mediation or
conciliation. Perhaps it is time to dust off the Clark-Sohn plan for a
World Conciliation Board" 1 that would provide expert mediators and
conciliators to review issues of self-determination. The United Nations
might also consider establishing a more formal tribunal with jurisdiction
to hear cases involving issues of political and civil rights, secession and
self-determination."' A general instrument on the settlement of disputes
is another idea whose time may have come. Meanwhile, the 1990 United
Nations Draft Rules for the Conciliation of Disputes between States' 3
and the Handbook on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes between
States3 provide a reliable framework for achieving a dispute settlement
after negotiations have failed.
Regional arrangements, particularly in Europe, will be of growing as-
sistance in resolving disputes before they ripen into serious conflict. For
example, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) has mediated disputes
in the Horn of Africa, between Algeria and Moracco, Mauritania and Se-
negal, and between Benin and Niger. The CSCE's new Conflict Preven-
tion Centre and mechanism for resolving international disputes 3 5 holds
promise. Particularly noteworthy are the CSCE's plans to seek new meth-
ods for the peaceful settlement of disputes,'" "including mandatory
without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion ....
U.N. CHARTER art. 1(3).
Article 33
1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger
the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a
solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial
settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful
means of their own choice.
2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to
settle their dispute by such means.
Id. art. 33.
131. GRENVILLE CLARK & Louis B. SOHN, WORLD PEACE THROUGH WORLD LAW 335, 340
(2d ed. 1960).
132. See generally LEE C. BUCHHEIT, SECESSION: THE LEGITIMACY OF SELF-DETERMINA-
TION (1978).
133. Draft Rules for the Conciliation of Disputes between States, U.N. Doc. No. A/45/
742 (1990), reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 229 (1991).
134. See Progress Report by the Secretary General, A/AC.182/L.68 (1990).
135. Paris Charter, supra note 27, at 207.
136. Valletta Report on Peaceful Settlement, supra note 27, at 384, 390.
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third-party involvement,' 13 7 and to develop, "new procedures involving..
• the services of experts or a roster of eminent persons experienced in
"138human rights issues ....
To strengthen the role of regional organizations, the Secretary-Gen-
eral might establish a permanent staff to coordinate the Secretariat and
regional organizations on issues of self-determination. This permanent
staff could also help strengthen regional facilities for resolving disputes
without fragmenting global efforts. With technical and financial assis-
tance from the United Nations, regional organizations could be more ef-
fective in helping ensure international peace and security. They have a
strong stake in what happens in their neighborhood, or neighborhoods in
the case of multi-regional states such as Egypt, the United States and
some members of the European Community. Proper financing will be
critical. For example, if the OAU had been better financed, it might well
have succeeded in arranging an earlier ceasefire in the Chad civil war. 39
When humanitarian intervention is unavoidable, the United Nations
should multilaterize it by exercising its enforcement powers with Resolu-
tion 688 as precedent.'40 Alternatively, the United Nations should decide
whether to authorize and regulate regional or unilateral intervention. Pro-
visional measures under Article 40 could be used,"" as in the Kuwaiti
crisis preceding the Gulf War.
In the absence of an effective, on-going enforcement mechanism that
is equipped to respond immediately to national crises of self-determina-
tion or other crises of human rights significance, the General Assembly
and the Security Council might jointly adopt a resolution on humanita-
rian intervention. It should preempt unilateral actions. Accordingly,
137. Paris Charter, supra note 27, at 201 (emphasis added).
138. Id. at 200.
139.
Stronger regional organizations, supported by a United Nations providing eco-
nomic and financial assistance, would obviate the necessity for the big powers
to get directly involved in most cases. We saw that when the OAU was willing
and almost able to protect Chad against Libya, but failed for want of adequate
financing. The United Nations refused to provide financial assistance on the
ground that this was a regional matter outside its jurisdiction-a technical
point that could have been met easily by some clever arrangement, especially
since the United Nations has been willing to support regional efforts in other
peacemaking contexts such as the Contadora Group.
Louis B. Sohn, Remarks, 83 AM. Soc'Y. INT'L. L. PROC. 443 (1990).
140. S/RES/688, supra note 91.
141. Article 40.
In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council
may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures pro-
vided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such
provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional mea-
sures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties
concerned. The Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply
with such provisional measures.
U.N. CHARTER art. 40.
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member states would be authorized, only under the resolution, to under-
take measures in other states that are deemed necessary to vindicate fun-
damental human rights. Such measures might include the use of force,
unless the target state agreed within a reasonable period of time to sub-
mit immediately to fact-finding and conciliation procedures, and in good
faith to carry out any resulting recommendations or decisions. Under Ar-
ticles 98 and 99 of the U.N. Charter, the Secretary-General might con-
tinue to play a central role. Rescue missions requiring an immediate re-
sponse would be an exception; these would be governed primarily by
customary rules of law, such as immediacy, proportionality, and necessity.
Thus, humanitarian intervention by one state would only be permissible
under two circumstances: first, if a target state had declined to submit a
dispute to impartial review within a reasonable period of time; second, if
after agreeing to do so, the target state failed to comply in good faith with
resulting recommendations or decisions. Humanitarian intervention
would be subsumed within a process of community decision, and would
be authorized only as a last resort when Article 33 procedures have failed.
Effective community deliberations and collective initiatives, rather than
unilateral argument and doctrinal justification of intervention, would be-
come the hallmark of a new process of multilateral dispute resolution.
VI. CONCLUSION
Issues of self-determination and humanitarian intervention abound
in the post-Cold War era. To prevent these issues from ripening into seri-
ous threats to international peace and security, more preventive diplo-
macy, contingency planning and collective initiatives by regional and in-
ternational institutions are sorely needed. In the community of power
made possible by revived confidence of states in multilateralism, United
Nations efforts should be pre-emptive rather than reactive, practical
rather than legalistic. Perhaps the day will arrive when unilateral self-
determination and humanitarian intervention will have become largely
obsolete. Instead, turning these terms around, the global community will
rely on international and regional organizations to make binding humani-
tarian determinations about self-interventions by states as well as foreign
interventions. We may learn to rely, after so many battles, on the better
angels of our nature and become more than weasels fighting in a hole.1 42
142. First Inaugural Address by Abraham Lincoln (Mar. 4, 1861), reprinted in INAUGU-
RAL ADDRESSES OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES, S. Doc. No. 10, 101st Cong., 1st
Sess., at 133, 141 (Bicentennial ed. 1989).
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